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Abstract  
We read with interest the extended essay published from Dr Riisfeldt and are encouraged 
by an empirical ethics article which attempts to ground theory and its claims in the real-
world. However, such attempts also have real world consequences.  We are concerned to 
read the paper’s conclusion that clinical evidence weakens the distinction between 
euthanasia and normal palliative care prescribing. 
This is important. Globally the most significant barrier to adequate symptom control in 
people with life limiting illness is poor access to opioid analgesia. Opiophobia makes 
clinicians reluctant to prescribe and their patients reluctant to take opioids that might 
provide significant improvements in quality of life.  
We argue that the evidence base for the safety of opioid prescribing is broader than that 
presented, restricting the search to palliative care literature produces significant bias as 
safety experience and literature for opioids and sedatives exists in many fields. This is not 
acknowledged in the synthesis presented. By considering additional evidence we reject the 
need for agnosticism and reaffirm that palliative opioid prescribing is safe. 
Secondly, palliative sedation in a clinical context is a poorly defined concept covering 
multiple interventions and treatment intentions. We detail these and show that Continuous 
Deep Palliative Sedation (CDPS) is a specific practice that remains controversial globally and 
is not considered routine practice. 
Rejecting agnosticism towards opioids and excluding CDPS from the definition of routine 
care allows the rejection of Riisfeldt’s headline conclusion. On these grounds we re-affirm 
the important distinction between palliative care prescribing and euthanasia in practice. 
  
We read with interest the extended essay published from Dr Riisfeldt(1) and are encouraged 
by an l ethics article with empirical evidence that attempts to ground theory and its claims 
in the real-world. This is the world we inhabit in our daily clinical practice.  
However, such attempts grounded in an incomplete evidence-base also have real world 
consequences specifically for clinical practice.  We are concerned that the paper concludes 
that clinical evidence supports the finding that the distinction between euthanasia and 
normal palliative care opioid and sedative prescribing is not as clear as people might believe. 
We contend, from additional evidence, that this is both factually wrong and likely to cause 
significant concern and fear for current and future patients, their families and healthcare 
professionals. 
This is important. Globally the most significant barrier to adequate symptom control in 
people with life limiting illness is poor access to opioid analgesia. Regional variation in their 
availability is inequitable and justified often by the assumption that they are addictive and 
lethal as a matter of course.(2) ‘Opiophobia’ makes clinicians reluctant to prescribe and 
their patients reluctant to take opioids that might provide significant improvements in 
quality of life.(3)  
In order for applied philosophy to be usedul it is important that it leaves or at least gives the 
abstract its real-world application and engages with the context of issues under 
investigation. It is paramount, however, that the rigour applied to the philosophical is also 
applied to selection, generation and processing of the empirical. (4) 
In this response we argue that the empirical aspect of Dr Riisfeldt’s argument does not meet 
with the rigour required. This paper aims to highlight areas of the review’s methodology 
that introduce bias in the findings and to introduce the reader to some of the wider 
literature on opioid safety from other clinical fields, to allow readers to form a broader 
opinion of the available evidence. We believe that this evidence allows for a rejection of 
agnosticism on the safety of opioids. We also aim to clarify the conceptual variation 
surrounding palliative sedation as a term within clinical practice.  
We do not intend to critique in detail the author’s interesting examination of the Doctrine of 
Double Effect. We argue that the full evidential picture demonstrates that routine 
prescribing does not shorten life, and therefore resorting to the Doctrine of Double Effect is 
irrelevant, whatever the strengths or weaknesses inherent to the doctrine.  
This rejection of Riisfeldt’s agnosticism allows us to clarify why routine palliative care 
prescribing practices and euthanasia are distinct and different. This holds irrespective of 
one’s views on the appropriateness of physician assisted dying in any of its forms. 
Clinical Definition in Context 
Appropriately Titrated Administration of Opioids (ATAO) 
Riisfeldt is right generally that prescribing excessive doses of any drug is reckless, likely to be 
harmful and potentially lethal. Insulin is the best and most widespread example. For opioids, 
inappropriate escalation or doses, disproportionate to individual need risk, respiratory 
dysfunction. However, some people require and tolerate, with no ill effect, very large doses 
of opioids to control their pain. A study by Estfan on the respiratory effect of opioid doses 
used for analgesia show a range of final doses from 72mg to 21600 mg (daily oral morphine 
equivalent dose) - orders of magnitude different and yet demonstrably safe, based on 
irrefutable physiological parameters.(5) Another example from Edwards et al focuses on 
sedation in ventilation withdrawal procedures. This case series describes the paradoxical 
observation that sedation prolongs life when ventilatory support is withdrawn and that the 
time to death reflects underlying respiratory function directly and not sedative or opioid 
use. This study also gives a history as to why the original research in the 1950’s that linked 
opioids and barbiturates with increased risk of mortality might have erred in the causative 
pathway.(6) 
Given our understanding of the broader relevant literature base, we consider it 
inappropriate to adopt an agnostic position on the safety of routine palliative care opioid 
prescribing. The objective and relevant empirical literature demonstrates the safety of 
routine palliative care prescribing. 
Palliative Sedation  
Sedative prescribing is complex, and practice varies depending on the indication, setting and 
international context. The term ‘palliative sedation’ is used across the literature loosely and 
encompasses disparate prescribing practices, covering a broad selection of pharmaceutical 
agents, indications and intentions – see this recent review by Robert Twycross.(7) It is more 
of a concept than a specific and comparable clinical intervention.  
To make sense of sedation the imperative is to distinguish between symptom control and 
transient ‘clinically-indicated’ sedation, for say a procedure, and continuing ‘sedation on 
demand’.  
 
The ‘everyday’ expert control of specific symptoms using targeted and titrated drugs as part 
of a comprehensive treatment plan accords with best practice. This is ‘acceptably’ safe as it 
applies equally across all disciplines of healthcare and at all points in a person’s disease 
trajectory. When transient sedation is needed to manage time-limited crises or incidents, 
standard drugs will reduce or remove cognitive awareness. Managing burns, wound care or 
the acute distress that accompanies traumas are good examples of specific uses. This is 
‘acceptably’ safe. Though necessary, such sedation is never desirable (i.e. it is a means but 
not an end).  
 
Continuing Deep Palliative Sedation 
 
Continuing Deep Palliative Sedation (CDPS) should not be grouped with routine palliative 
prescribing. It remains controversial globally. The ‘atypical’ electing to put a patient into an 
induced coma, at the patient’s request, potentially weeks or months in advance of what 
may have been a peaceful death is not in line with acceptable practice in many health 
systems. In the United Kingdom (UK) ‘coma on demand’ is not considered best practice in 
any discipline of healthcare or at any point in a patient’s trajectory, and it is not part of 
routine UK palliative care practice. The European Association of Palliative Care (EAPC) 
guidelines are also clear.(8) CDPS, though described in some medicolegal jurisdictions 
outside of the UK, imagines ‘special rules’ for patients with advanced illness and can indeed 
overlap with euthanasia, both in theory and in practice (and typically without the same level 
of legal safeguards even if inherently limited). Examples of this exist in jurisdictions where 
legalisation of various euthanasian practices exist.  One explanation is that it reflects the 
disorientation to which it subjects clinicians when ending life is seen as a type of treatment, 
rather than being separated clearly from clinical practice. 
 
In summary the inclusion of CDPS into the analysis of ‘widely accepted mainstream practices 
of palliative are opioid/sedative use’ p6 (1) is invalid. 
 
Literature Review Methodology 
 
In recent years increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for literature reviews to be 
systematic, prospectively registered, and designed and reported with regards to agreed 
standards, for example the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines.(9) This best practice approach is promoted to help readers 
identify and researchers possibly mitigate potential sources of bias within a review. This 
protocol standard is missing from the review and as such, the retrieved records may 
inadvertently contain significant bias, which cannot be identified as much of the 
methodology is not described.  
To us, a clear and significant source of bias in the empirical review presented is the sole 
focus on the palliative care literature. All reviews involve choices in inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, however this narrow focus is not justified in the article, and this is important as 
much of the documented safety experience of opioids and sedation lies outside the field of 
palliative care. This includes both Edward’s (6) and Estfan’s (5) research above.  
There is not space for a more detailed description of the empirical literature here, and we 
recommend reviewing the cited articles in this review commentary by one of the 
authors.(10)  
In summary, we do not wish to underplay the amount of work the author has undertaken in 
producing the review. However, the author has excluded a significant volume of relevant 
literature and does not describe the methodology of the review in detail. If this review is to 
be used as a base to argue for a challenge to accepted thinking on the distinction between 
palliative care and euthanasia then it must be robust, and there are too many 
methodological uncertainties for this to be the case. 
 
 
Conclusion 
We value, welcome and encourage input into our field from all disciplines and are always 
prepared to consider and respond to challenges to our practice and the principles behind it. 
We hope that our response will allow for an updated real-world context to be considered by 
those academics who take this work forward. 
The broader empirical evidence is clear that appropriately titrated opioid use is safe. CDPS is 
not part of routine practice and therefore its inclusion into the analysis is unwarranted. 
Excluding CDPS allows for the reaffirmation that sedative use is also safe.  
The importance of reviewing the full literature is that it shows the prescribing within routine 
palliative care is safe and does not shorten life. As it does not shorten life, but only relieves 
suffering (fully or partially), there is no need to resort to the Doctrine of Double Effect to 
justify prescribing practice, whatever inherent merits of challenges the doctrine may 
possess. 
As palliative care physicians we work daily with many complex ethical challenges. We have 
to ground ethical debate in the real-world and we are obliged to base this on the best 
empirical data available that represent accurately the problems at hand in the right clinical 
context required. Thought experiments will not harm people, but clinical mis-information 
will. 
Finally, we do not wish to down play the dangers of inappropriate prescribing of opioids or 
sedatives. We stress that training in palliative prescribing must form part of all healthcare 
prescribers’ education and clinical governance procedures. Recurrent examples of poor 
prescribing and resultant lethal outcomes persist. They are as unacceptable in palliative care 
as any branch of modern clinical practice. 
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